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Performance Standards and 





A number of recently implemented reforms to public sector incen-
tive systems have sought to reorient them toward a focus on measuring 
results and inducing public agencies to become more effi cient, respon-
sive, and accountable to the public. They share at least two features. 
The fi rst is a system of performance measures and standards designed 
to create clear expectations for government performance and to assess 
results. A second feature is a means for rewarding individuals, teams, 
or entire organizations for achievement relative to the established per-
formance goals, primarily through budgetary allocations. By clearly 
defi ning goals and developing explicit rewards for their attainment, 
these systems have aimed to replicate, in a nonmarket setting, the in-
centive structures, competition, and resulting high performance and 
effi ciency of private markets (Light 2005).
Among its fi rst steps in advancing these reforms, the Obama ad-
ministration has required federal agencies to identify a limited number 
of high-priority performance goals for which performance trends will 
be tracked, and through its new Open Government initiative, it will 
make these data publicly available and promote the use of new meth-
ods in the analysis of them. The government is also now compelling 
the private sector to provide more information on its performance for 
transparency and accountability (beyond longer-standing areas of pub-
lic scrutiny such as health care and the environment), and has devised 
incentives for cooperation and penalties for withholding information 
(Cukier 2010). For example, it is now possible for the public to get sta-
2   Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith
tistics on job-related deaths that name employers and to see restaurants’ 
health inspection scores online.
As the use of performance measurement and incentive systems 
has expanded in the public sector, so has the number of studies calling 
attention to their problems and unintended effects (Bevan and Hood 
2006; Brooks 2000; Courty and Marschke 2004; Heckman and Smith 
2004; Heinrich 2004, 2007; Heinrich and Marschke 2010; Koning and 
Heinrich 2010; Propper and Wilson 2003; Radin 2000; Smith 1995; 
General Accounting Offi ce [GAO] 2002). Performance standards sys-
tems and bonuses are (or have been) used in Food Stamps (now the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) and welfare-to-work 
programs, employment and training programs, public school account-
ability systems under No Child Left Behind, child welfare agencies and 
child support enforcement programs, Medicaid and SCHIP programs, 
and other social programs, although not without some degree of con-
troversy and ongoing challenges in their design and implementation. 
The development of performance incentive systems in public bureau-
cracies also continues to advance in Europe, led by Great Britain’s 
early exploration, and with some governments (such as Australia and 
the Netherlands) now implementing incentive systems with fully (100 
percent) performance-contingent pay/contracting arrangements (Finn 
2008; Struyven and Steurs 2005). 
While the broad introduction of incentive systems in many gov-
ernment agencies is new, U.S. employment and training programs 
have used both performance standards and monetary bonuses for over 
two decades. Klerman (2005, p. 347) describes the Job Training Part-
nership Act (JTPA)/Workforce Investment Act (WIA) performance 
measurement system as one of the “most mature implementations of 
performance-based management.” It is also one of the most studied 
systems, in part because of the randomized experimental evaluation of 
the JTPA program that produced important information for assessing 
the performance of these performance standards systems in measuring 
program impacts (Bloom et al. 1993; Dickinson et al. 1988; Heckman, 
Heinrich, and Smith 2002; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999; Orr 
et al. 1995). Policymakers have looked to the results of these studies to 
guide changes to these systems in employment and training programs 
and to also inform the design and operation of performance standards 
systems in other government programs. 
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At the same time, one of our motivations for assembling the research 
presented in this book is that despite decades of study and practice, 
some of the important lessons that have been learned are not refl ected 
in the current design and implementation of performance standards sys-
tems. Bevan and Hood (2006), for example, describe the development 
and use of performance targets in the English public health care system, 
along with the perverse incentives they generated, as “hitting the target 
and missing the point.”1 And despite the long tenure of performance 
standards in U.S. employment and training programs, a 2002 GAO re-
port (p. 14) confi rms the persistence of gaming responses that infl uence 
who gets access to program services as well as service intensity, con-
cluding that “the need to meet performance levels may be the driving 
factor in deciding who receives WIA-funded services at the local level.” 
It may be that some of the more rigorous empirical evidence from 
past studies has not been effectively communicated or penetrated 
policymaking and public management circles deeply enough.2 Or, as 
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith comment in Chapter 3, it may be that 
policymakers who have mandated such systems (and administrators 
involved in their implementation) have not fully appreciated the chal-
lenges of designing a performance management system that generates 
incentives for improving program impacts. Research in this area has 
also continued to evolve, with advances in theoretical conceptions, 
modeling, and data, and of course, changes in the incentive systems 
over time have facilitated analysis of their implications for performance 
standards system design and functioning. The chapters included in this 
volume embody a number of these important advancements, and yet 
our primary aim is to make the lessons of our research clear to those 
who design and implement these incentive systems in the public sector. 
The nine chapters that follow use U.S. employment and training 
programs as a “laboratory” for investigation. They draw extensively 
from the data and experiences of the earlier JTPA performance stan-
dards system, both because of its longer tenure and the availability of 
experimental data. Using a variety of data sources on these incentives 
systems, the authors of these chapters explore how performance stan-
dards and incentives affect the behavior of public managers and agency 
employees, their approaches to service delivery, and ultimately, the out-
comes for participants. Both the JTPA and WIA programs have allowed 
state and local administrators and their governing boards substantial 
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discretion, within broad limits, to determine performance goals, stan-
dards, and bonus systems. This administrative fl exibility is refl ected in 
the range of incentive systems that have been implemented by different 
states and by the same states over time. It is this variation that serves as 
the grist for our empirical mill and is used to extract general lessons that 
can be applied on a wider scale to both existing and newly developing 
performance incentive systems.
KEY QUESTIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS SYSTEMS IN U.S.
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMS
While investigating formal incentive structures and organizational 
behavior within U.S. employment and training programs, the authors in 
this volume address the following six fundamental questions: 
1) How do performance standards and measures operate to in-
clude or exclude individuals with different characteristics in 
these programs? 
2) How do performance standards and measures affect the types 
of services offered? 
3) How do the processes for setting standards and weights for 
performance goals and for recognizing and rewarding perfor-
mance affect system incentives and bureaucratic responses?
4) Are the performance standards, measures, and incentives 
effective in motivating bureaucratic behavior toward the 
achievement of program goals? 
5) Do short-term outcome measures used in the performance stan-
dards systems predict long-term impacts of the programs on 
participants? 
6) What general lessons can be learned from a study of these 
performance standards systems and the variation in the rules 
governing their administration over time? 
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In the next chapter, the JTPA and WIA performance standards 
systems are described in greater detail. Below, we briefl y list four key 
features of the programs that are pertinent to understanding the contri-
butions of this volume. We follow with an overview of the chapters and 
their salient fi ndings.
1) Federal job training programs (formerly JTPA and currently 
WIA) are highly decentralized. Local level governing boards 
include local business offi cials along with other government, 
community, and labor leaders. States control most aspects of 
the performance standards system that guides training activi-
ties, including determining the rules that govern how outcome 
measures count and how performance awards are made. 
2) Workforce development programs generate relatively easily 
measured outcomes such as employment, wages, completion of 
education programs, enrollment in the military, and continued 
schooling. More diffi cult to assess, however, is the value added 
produced by the programs, which, as we show, does not neces-
sarily correlate strongly with shorter-term outcome measures.
3) Most performance standards have been formulated in terms 
of levels of achievement, rather than in terms of achievement 
gains resulting from program participation. This practice gives 
rise to the potential for “cream skimming,” which results when 
centers enroll persons who are likely to have high outcome 
levels rather than those whose outcomes would improve most 
through participation in the program. 
4) Training centers (or states under WIA) that meet or exceed their 
performance standards typically receive budgetary rewards. 
Training centers have shown, however, that they can manipu-
late the performance standards system in ways that improve 
measured performance but may not contribute to value-added 
or individual gains. The ability of program managers and staff 
to manipulate the data used to monitor them poses a major 
challenge to the successful design of performance standards 
systems.
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OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS AND THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP TO PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The studies in this volume take advantage of data that are superior 
in scope and detail to some of the data used in the existing literature or 
available on a regular basis for assessing program performance. The 
research described in Chapters 4, 6, 8, and 9 benefi tted from detailed 
longitudinal, microlevel data that were collected in the National JTPA 
Study (NJS) and through other administrative data sources. The NJS 
data also include information on JTPA-eligible nonparticipants in four 
experimental sites. These data have two important advantages over 
samples of eligible populations constructed from large public-use data 
sets: 1) they are collected from eligible nonparticipants residing in the 
same geographical area as participants, and 2) the data are gathered us-
ing the same survey instruments as those used for participants. 
In addition, the authors collect and analyze complete information 
about state-level variation in the JTPA and WIA performance standards 
systems. Chapters 4 and 5 show that state incentive systems are highly 
complex and differ widely across states and over time within states. They 
are not easily characterized by small dimensional summary measures as 
used in previous studies (see, for example, Anderson, Burkhauser, and 
Raymond [1993] and Dickinson et al. [1988]). This wealth of data is 
very helpful in assessing the implications of changes and differences in 
performance standard regimes, and a variety of analytical strategies are 
applied to learn from these data. 
Before addressing the key questions listed above, the contributing 
authors provide some basic information in Chapter 2 about the design 
and implementation of the JTPA and WIA programs to aid our readers’ 
understanding of the research that follows. Chapter 2 describes the ori-
gins and organizational structure of these programs, eligibility rules and 
the types of services made available to participants, details of the per-
formance measures, and other aspects of these performance standards 
systems’ design. Chapter 2 also highlights some of the changes in these 
systems over time, particularly in the shift from JTPA to WIA. 
In Chapter 3, James Heckman, Carolyn Heinrich, and Jeffrey Smith 
set up a formal model of a performance standards system that theo-
retically frames many of the fundamental questions and issues that are 
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addressed in this book. For example, their model demonstrates how the 
JTPA and WIA program goals to promote equity and effi ciency inter-
act with a performance standards system based on short-term outcome 
measures. As such, they show that whether or not cream skimming is 
at odds with equity or effi ciency (or both) is an empirical question that 
depends on the relationship between the benefi ts of program services 
and the location of trainees in the skill distribution of applicants. Im-
portantly, the broad conceptual framework that they develop provides 
a foundation for future investigation about when (and if) performance 
standards systems in active labor market programs will increase labor 
market impacts, and when (and if) they are more likely to have unin-
tended consequences due to responses by program staff to the incentives 
they provide.
In Chapter 4, Courty and Marschke describe the structure of the 
JTPA performance standards system and highlight important details 
that go into developing a performance-contingent budgeting scheme. 
They describe the performance measures upon which awards were con-
tingent, the nature of the awards, and how performance awards were 
computed in JTPA; they also show how crucial the handling of these de-
tails can be to the success of performance funding. Courty and Marschke 
fi nd that interstate differences in the implementation of the performance 
incentives system grew over time, refl ecting the substantial discretion 
federal authorities gave to state and local agencies in its management. 
Their fi ndings suggest that the objectives of states’ incentive systems 
increasingly diverged from the original federal ones, leading to some 
unintended consequences.
Courty, Heinrich, and Marschke draw from the information eco-
nomics, contract theory, and public administration literatures to derive 
theoretical implications for the establishment of appropriate benchmark 
levels of performance (i.e., performance standards) in Chapter 5. They 
then assess alternative methods that are commonly used to construct 
performance standards and evaluate their application in the JTPA and 
WIA systems. They fi nd evidence that performance measurement sys-
tem designers have attempted to “level the playing fi eld” over time to 
provide equivalent performance incentives across states and localities. 
However, they also identify some negative dynamic properties of the 
JTPA and WIA performance measurement systems. The dynamics of 
performance benchmarking, and the politically motivated ambition to 
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demonstrate continuous performance improvement, likely introduced 
ineffi ciencies and generated incentives to infl uence performance in 
ways other than increasing effort. These potentially harmful behaviors 
include selecting trainees according to observed characteristics associ-
ated with their labor market success, limiting the availability of more 
intensive training services and demonstrating lower performance early 
on to allow for performance improvements over time. 
In Chapter 6, Heckman and Smith present a detailed, step-by-step 
analysis of the process by which individuals become participants in 
employment and training programs. Using data from the JTPA system, 
the goal of their analysis is to determine the sources of demographic 
disparities in participation rates and to isolate the roles of personal in-
formation, program eligibility rules, and administrative discretion in 
determining the probability of program participation. Disparities aris-
ing from voluntary decisions not to participate by informed persons 
raise different policy concerns from disparities arising from inequitable 
administrative practices or bureaucratic treatment. Models for the de-
termination of eligibility, awareness of the program, and application 
and acceptance into the program are estimated. Bureaucratic discretion 
is assumed to play the major role in the fi nal stage of the process. The 
evidence reported in this chapter indicates that while cream skimming 
is an important feature of the JTPA program, program eligibility rules, 
the personal choices of potential participants, and informational con-
straints are also important determinants of demographic disparities in 
JTPA participation. 
Another important lesson from the incentive literature is that ex-
plicit incentives may elicit unintended and dysfunctional responses, 
also known as gaming responses. In Chapter 7, Courty and Marschke 
present a comprehensive overview of the literature on dysfunctional 
responses and develop a theoretical framework to classify the vari-
ous dysfunctional responses that have been identifi ed in practice. 
They distinguish three types of dysfunctional responses: 1) account-
ing manipulations that have no impact on the organization, 2) gaming 
responses that boost performance outcomes but have a negative impact 
on the organization, and 3) marginal misallocations that have positive 
impacts but are suboptimal because alternative allocations would have 
a higher impact. They then summarize the empirical evidence of dys-
functional responses in the JTPA system and assess the extent to which 
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such responses may impede the effective functioning of performance 
measurement systems.
A widely cited GAO report (1991) claims that the JTPA perfor-
mance standard system produced inequities by encouraging frequent 
routing of minorities and women into the least productive training ac-
tivities and by denying them training altogether. The GAO alleges that 
training centers’ pursuit of incentive payments and recognition for high 
performance has a perverse effect on participant selection as well as on 
trainees’ access to services. In Chapter 8, through an extensive analysis 
of a JTPA training center in Illinois, Heinrich shows that bureaucratic 
decisions involving the selection of participants and their assignments 
to JTPA program services are frequently interdependent. She combines 
case-study and econometric approaches to investigate the screening 
decisions made by program staff and the infl uence of performance stan-
dards on these decisions. Heinrich fi nds evidence that these frontline 
staff cream-skim in making their enrollment and treatment-assignment 
decisions, and she also documents how shifts in federal policy fostered 
a movement away from more costly but higher value-added services 
toward less costly services. In the face of declining JTPA budgets, it 
appears that bureaucrats sought to preserve their client load and main-
tain low costs by offering cheaper but less cost-effective services. The 
resulting effect, most likely unintended, is that bureaucrats cut service 
quality to keep program costs low and maintain service quantity.
In Chapter 9, Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith use data from the 
NJS to examine the relationship between the short-run performance 
measures used in the JTPA performance standards system, such as em-
ployment and wages at termination from the program (or 13 weeks after 
termination), and experimental estimates of the impact or value added 
of the program on employment and earnings. In most cases, the data 
reveal a very weak relationship between the short-run measures and 
the long-run impacts. In fact, this relationship is often perverse, so that 
higher short-run measures are associated with lower long-term impacts 
from training. The JTPA performance standards system was, and the 
current WIA system is, based on measures that are not highly correlated 
with the gains from the program. Thus, evidence presented in the other 
chapters that the performance standards system “works” in the sense 
that it motivates bureaucrats to achieve certain standards does not imply 
that the performance standards system leads training centers to choose 
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the combination of persons served and services offered that maximizes 
total gains obtained from the program.
In Chapter 10, Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith summarize three 
main lessons of the volume regarding the effectiveness of performance 
standards in public organizations and the need for further research. 
First, organizations respond to incentives, but sometimes the responses 
are perverse. In the fi rst iteration of an incentive system’s design, well-
meaning designers of the performance standards system are unlikely to 
anticipate the shrewd responses of program administrators and frontline 
workers to system incentives, or the many possible ways they might 
infl uence measured performance without necessarily adding to (or pos-
sibly even detracting from) program value or impact. For example, 
individuals’ access to program services and the nature and duration of 
the services participants receive are sometimes adversely affected by 
bureaucrats’ responses to the performance incentives. 
Second, the short-term outcome measures that continue to be used 
in the WIA performance standards system are only weakly related to 
the true long-run impacts of the program on earnings and employment. 
Measures of changes in earnings were tried under WIA but were dis-
continued, and the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) continues with 
measures of entry into unsubsidized employment, retention in unsub-
sidized employment six months after entry into the employment, and 
earnings levels six months after entry into the employment. Research-
ers and policymakers have yet to identify performance measures that 
will promote key, long-term program objectives while simultaneously 
generating more readily available performance information for ongoing 
program management.
Third, the importance of the cream skimming issue has been over-
stated in popular discussions. In the provision of employment and 
training services, the trade-off between effi ciency and equity is mod-
est at best. Personal choices and informational constraints play an 
important role in accounting for demographic differences in program 
participation among those eligible, while the effect of administrative 
discretion in accounting for demographic disparities among the eligible 
population is relatively limited. Chapter 10 includes a brief discussion 
of some policy implications of these fi ndings.
In his book The Dynamics of Performance Management, Donald 
Moynihan (2008, pp. 4–5) argues that performance management re-
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forms have become so central to recent public management agendas 
that it “is only a slight exaggeration to say that we are betting the fu-
ture of governance on the use of performance information.” Clearly, 
the design and implementation of performance standards and incentive 
systems in the public sector will continue to be a dynamic pursuit, and 
it is our hope that the lessons distilled in this volume will have a role in 
shaping and speeding their evolution and the improvement of govern-
ment performance. 
Notes
1. In the effort to achieve hospital accident and emergency waiting time targets, hospi-
tals cancelled operations and required patients to wait in ambulance queues outside 
the hospital until they were confi dent the patients could be seen within the targeted 
(four-hour) time. Bevan and Hood also fi nd discrepancies between offi cial reported 
levels of performance and those from independent surveys of patients. 
2. Or, it may be the case that some of the fundamental lessons from studies to date 
have been ignored or deferred in pursuit of other objectives (political or other-
wise); see, for example, Radin (2000).
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